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JORDAN, Circuit Judge 
 
This case involves product liability claims by 
individuals who allegedly suffered bone fractures because 
they took Fosamax® – a drug used to treat or prevent 
osteoporosis and Paget’s Disease – or the generic equivalent 
of that drug, alendronate sodium.  Those plaintiffs sued 
Merck Sharp & Dohme, Corp. (“Merck”), the manufacturer 
of Fosamax®, as well as several entities that manufacture the 
generic equivalent (the “Generic Defendants”).  The United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted 
judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Generic Defendants 
because it determined that the state-law claims against them 
were pre-empted by federal law.  The District Court certified 
the finality of that order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b), and a number of the plaintiffs have 
appealed.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 
I.   BACKGROUND 
 
 A.   Statutory and Regulatory Background1 
 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), ch. 
675, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 et 
seq.), provides the framework for federal regulation of 
prescription drugs in the United States.  Under the FDCA, a 
manufacturer must seek approval from the United States Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to market a new drug and, 
                                              
1 Be prepared for an avalanche of acronyms; for 
practical purposes, it is unavoidable. 
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in doing so, must first file a New Drug Application (“NDA”) 
and then prove the drug’s safety and efficacy and propose 
accurate and adequate labeling.  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), (d).  
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[m]eeting those 
requirements involves costly and lengthy clinical testing.”  
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574 (2011). 
 
Congress has amended the FDCA several times, 
including in 1984 by passage of the Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the “Hatch-
Waxman Act”), codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc and 35 
U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282.  The Hatch-Waxman Act governs 
the production and sale of generic versions of previously 
approved brand-name drugs.  In short, it allows the 
manufacturers of generic drugs to “gain FDA approval simply 
by showing equivalence to a … drug that has already been 
approved by the FDA.”  Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574 (citing 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)).  A manufacturer seeking approval 
of a generic drug will file an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (“ANDA”) demonstrating that the generic drug 
and the FDA-approved brand-name drug are bioequivalent;2 
in addition to having the same active ingredients, the brand-
name drug and the generic version must share the same route 
of administration, dosage form, dosage strength, and 
                                              
2 The FDA defines “bioequivalence” as “the absence 
of a significant difference in the rate and extent to which the 
active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical 
equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available 
at the site of drug action when administered at the same molar 
dose under similar circumstances in an appropriately designed 
study.”  21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e). 
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labeling.3  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)-(v).  The statutory aim 
is to “allow[] manufacturers to develop generic drugs 
inexpensively, without duplicating the clinical trials already 
performed on the equivalent brand-name drug.”  Mensing, 
131 S. Ct. at 2574. 
 
B.   Factual and Procedural Background4 
 
The FDA gave a green light to Merck’s NDA for 
Fosamax® in September 1995.  Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, 
Inc., one of the Generic Defendants, then developed 
alendronate sodium – a generic form of the branded drug – 
and obtained FDA approval on its ANDA in February 2008.  
The other Generic Defendants subsequently obtained 
approval for alendronate sodium formulations as well.5 
 
Alendronate sodium is a bisphosphonate drug that, as 
already noted, is “used for treating bone conditions such as 
osteoporosis and Paget’s disease.”  (J.A. Vol. 2 at 45.)  The 
                                              
3 This is, necessarily, a general and incomplete 
summary of a complicated regulatory scheme. 
4 These facts are taken from the complaint and treated 
as true because, “[i]n reviewing the grant of a Rule 12(c) 
motion, we must view the facts presented in the pleadings and 
the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Rosenau v. Unifund 
Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Jablonski v. 
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290-91 (3d Cir. 
1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
5 The parties treat all of the Generic Defendants as 
manufacturers of alendronate sodium, and so shall we.   
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drug acts “by inhibiting bone resorption [or absorption] and 
suppressing bone turnover.”6  (Id.)  Consequently, it also 
inhibits primary mineralization,7 which is involved in the 
formation of new bone.  Meanwhile, secondary 
mineralization of existing bone continues, which increases the 
bone’s mineral content and results in higher bone mineral 
density.  According to the plaintiffs, higher bone mineral 
density “does not necessarily correspond with reduction of 
fracture risk”; rather, it can make bone “highly mineralized, 
homogenous, brittle, and more susceptible to fracture.”  (Id. at 
46.)  According to some studies, the effects of alendronate 
sodium linger after treatment ends, with one study reporting 
that bone turnover may be inhibited by 50% even 5 years 
after discontinuing treatment.   
 
On February 28, 2011, 91 plaintiffs, who are citizens 
of 28 different states, filed this products liability suit in 
Missouri state court against both Merck and the Generic 
Defendants (collectively, the “Defendants”) for damages 
                                              
6 Bone turnover, or bone remodeling, is the 
“absorption of bone tissue and simultaneous deposition of 
new bone; in normal bone the two processes are in dynamic 
equilibrium.”  Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 
1623, 1991 (32d ed. 2012).  “Up to the age of 30 to 40, the 
two activities ([absorption] and formation) are balanced.  
Later in life, [absorption] exceeds new bone formation.”  J.E. 
Schmidt, Attorney’ Dictionary of Medicine, at B-166 (Pub. 
No. 609 Rel. No. 46 Oct. 2012). 
7 “Mineralization” refers to “[t]he introduction of 
minerals into a structure, as in the normal mineralization of 
bones.”  Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 1214 (28th ed. 2006). 
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related to “long bone fractures” that they suffered after taking 
prescribed doses of Fosamax® or alendronate sodium.8  (Id. 
at 21-41.)  The grounds they asserted for liability focused on 
the Defendants’ alleged “concealment of risks associated with 
[Fosamax® and/or alendronate sodium],” “gross exaggeration 
of the purported fracture reduction benefits conferred by the 
drugs,” and “overpromotion of the drugs for non-approved, or 
‘off-label,’ indications.”  (Id. at 17.)  Specifically, they 
brought product liability claims under theories of design 
defect, failure-to-warn, negligence, breach of express 
warranty, breach of implied warranty, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation.   
 
With the consent of the Generic Defendants, Merck 
removed the action to the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri.  The United States Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation later centralized the action with 
                                              
8 The following entities were named as the Generic 
Defendants in the complaint filed in state court:  Apotex 
Corp.; Barr Laboratories, Inc.; Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; 
Mylan Inc. f/k/a Mylan Laboratories, Inc.; Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals Inc.; Sun Pharma Global, Inc. o/b/o and f/k/a 
Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd.; Sun 
Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc.; Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, 
Inc.; Watson Laboratories, Inc.; Watson Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.; and Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. o/b/o and f/k/a Cobalt 
Pharmaceuticals Co.  On the District Court’s docket, Cobalt 
Laboratories, Inc. was also listed as one of the Generic 
Defendants. 
The corporate disclosure statements before us attempt 
to clarify the identities of several of the Generic Defendants, 
but those details are not relevant here. 
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several other Fosamax®-related lawsuits in a multi-district 
litigation (“MDL”), MDL No. 2243, in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey.   
 
Once the MDL was established, the Generic 
Defendants moved under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that 
the plaintiffs’ claims are pre-empted by federal law under the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.  The 
District Court granted the motion, holding that claims against 
the Generic Defendants relate to duties under state tort law 
that directly conflict with duties under federal regulations.  It 
read the strict-liability design-defect claims as alleging that 
“alendronate sodium should have been designed differently to 
comply with state tort law.”  (Id. at 188.)  The District Court’s 
pre-emption decision anticipated reasoning given by the 
Supreme Court in its opinion last term in Mutual 
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).  
While the District Court did not have the benefit of the 
Bartlett opinion, it was guided by another recent Supreme 
Court case, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, which it understood to 
say “that a federal duty of sameness arising out of [the] 
FDA’s regulatory requirements preempts any conflicting tort 
duty arising under state law.”  (J.A. Vol. 2 at 188.)  The 
District Court thus concluded that the claims against the 
Generic Defendants are pre-empted because, just as those 
defendants cannot lawfully change drug labeling for 
alendronate sodium, they cannot lawfully change the active 
ingredient design of the drug either.   
 
In a series of orders, the Court dismissed all of the 
Generic Defendants from the case, leaving only Merck as a 
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defendant.9  Several of the plaintiffs  – 73 of the 91 
(hereinafter the “Appellants”) – then filed this appeal.   
 
II.   JURISDICTION 
 
We first determine whether we have jurisdiction over 
this appeal before we proceed with the merits.  The “parties 
have indicated their consent to our appellate jurisdiction, but 
‘it is well established that we have an independent duty to 
satisfy ourselves of our appellate jurisdiction regardless of the 
parties’ positions.’”  Papotto v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. 
Co., 731 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Kreider Dairy 
Farms, Inc. v. Glickman, 190 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
The scope of our review concerning questions of our own 
jurisdiction is plenary.  United States v. Pelullo, 178 F.3d 
196, 200 (3d Cir. 1999).  “[I]f we determine that we do not 
have jurisdiction over this appeal, our ‘only function 
                                              
9 The District Court initially denied the Generic 
Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to 
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Watson Laboratories, Inc. 
(collectively, the “Watson Defendants”) because, under Rule 
12(c), the Court took as true the Plaintiffs’ allegation that the 
Watson Defendants were not generic manufacturers.  
However, the Court subsequently granted the Watson 
Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, thereby granting 
judgment on the pleadings to them as well.  In addition, the 
District Court initially denied the Generic Defendants’ motion 
for judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiffs who had filed a 
motion for remand and/or notice of voluntary dismissal.  The 
Court later resolved the motion for remand and “dismisse[d] 
… Plaintiffs’ claims against Generic Defendants as 
preempted.”  (J.A. Vol. 1 at 11.) 
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remaining [will be] that of announcing the fact and dismissing 
the case.’”  Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 219 
(3d Cir. 2012) (second alteration in original) (quoting Steel 
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)). 
 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction 
over appeals from “final decisions of the district courts of the 
United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “Generally, an order 
which terminates fewer than all claims pending in an action 
or claims against fewer than all the parties to an action does 
not constitute a ‘final’ order for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.”  Elliot, 682 F.3d at 219.  However, under Rule 54(b) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a district court may 
convert an order adjudicating less than an entire action to the 
end that it becomes a ‘final’ decision over which a court of 
appeals may exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”  
Id. 
 
This appeal was originally taken from the District 
Court’s order that, inter alia, dismissed all claims except 
those against Merck.10  The District Court, at the time, did not 
enter judgment under Rule 54(b).  We sua sponte raised the 
issue of jurisdiction, and the parties acknowledged in a Rule 
28(j) letter that this appeal was taken from a non-final order 
for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The parties have since 
jointly sought and obtained certification from the District 
Court under Rule 54(b) for “entry of a final judgment as to 
                                              
10 The District Court exercised diversity jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 after it “disregard[ed], for purposes 
of jurisdiction, the citizenship of fraudulently joined” parties.  
(J.A. Vol. 1 at 10.)  That ruling is not challenged on appeal, 
and we see no reason to disturb it. 
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one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 54(b). 
 
Obtaining a final judgment cures the jurisdictional 
defect of an otherwise premature appeal.  N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. 
PPG Indus., Inc., 197 F.3d 96, 102 n.5 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We 
conclude that any jurisdictional defects inherent in the 
District Court’s [earlier, non-final] order were cured by the 
[Rule] 54(b) certification, and that we therefore have 
jurisdiction to consider th[e] appeal.”); see also Cape May 
Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(“[A] premature appeal taken from an order which is not final 
but which is followed by an order that is final may be 
regarded as an appeal from the final order in the absence of 
the showing of prejudice to the other party.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  Therefore, despite the premature 
filing of the initial notice of appeal, we now have jurisdiction 
to consider the District Court’s rulings in favor of the Generic 
Defendants. 
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III.   DISCUSSION11 
 
A.   The Claims at Issue on Appeal 
 
The Appellants challenge only the judgment entered 
against them on their design-defect claims, which were held 
to be pre-empted.  Before turning to the merits, we need to 
determine the scope of the claims before us, as some shape-
shifting has been attempted.  The parties, and particularly the 
Appellants, have been trying to catch up with precedential 
developments, most importantly the Supreme Court’s Bartlett 
decision.  Consequently, as more fully described herein, the 
Appellants’ arguments have changed from their opening to 
their reply briefs.  In their reply brief, the Appellants contend 
that they preserved their appeal on “all aspects of their design 
defect claims, including … those based on negligent design 
theories.”  (Appellants’ Reply Br. at 3.)  They assert that their 
negligence-based design-defect claims are grounded on the 
                                              
11 The Appellants technically appealed the District 
Court’s order, signed on April 2, 2012, that granted in part 
and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion for remand.  In that 
order, the Court dismissed the claims against the Generic 
Defendants as pre-empted, “[t]o the extent” its previous 
judgment on the pleadings did not already reach all of the 
Generic Defendants.  (J.A. Vol. 1 at 11.)  The Appellants’ 
arguments focus on, and demonstrate an intention to appeal, 
only the portion of the order relating to the judgment on the 
pleadings.  We review de novo an order granting judgment on 
the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 
221 (3d Cir. 2008); Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 
661, 665 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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theory that the Generic Defendants were negligent “because 
of their failure to properly analyze Alendronate Sodium to 
discover the product’s defects and for negligently continuing 
to sell Alendronate Sodium after they were, or should have 
been aware, that it was defectively designed.”12  (Id. at 13.) 
 
The Generic Defendants respond that the Appellants 
waived any arguments regarding negligence-based design-
defect claims by raising them for the first time in their reply 
brief and that, instead, the only claims on appeal are the 
Appellants’ strict-liability design-defect claims.  We agree. 
 
“We have consistently held that ‘[a]n issue is waived 
unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those 
purposes a passing reference to an issue … will not suffice to 
bring that issue before this court.’”  Ethypharm S.A. France v. 
Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 231 n.13 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. 
Am. v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d 
Cir. 1994)).  The Appellants contend that they did raise the 
issue of negligence in their opening brief, and they point to 
their Statement of the Issues, which says: “The only issues for 
this Court’s determination are whether the district court erred 
when it granted the [G]eneric [Defendants’] motion to 
dismiss on the basis of federal preemption as to plaintiffs’ 
                                              
12 The Appellants do not identify which count in their 
complaint allegedly constitutes their negligence-based design-
defect claim, but Count XI, titled “NEGLIGENCE,” is the 
only one pled against the Generic Defendants that seems to fit 
that description.  (J.A. Vol. 2 at 74.) 
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design defect claims.”13  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 2.)  The 
idea, it seems, is that the words “design defect claims” are 
broad enough to encompass negligence-based design-defect 
claims.  However, the Appellants’ Summary of the Argument 
in their opening brief states more specifically that “[t]he 
district court erred in dismissing appellants’ risk-utility based 
design defect claims.”  (Id. at 9 (emphasis added).)  Count IX, 
titled “STRICT LIABILITY – DEFECTIVE DESIGN,” is the 
only design-defect claim against the Generic Defendants 
brought under a risk-utility based theory, specifically that the 
“foreseeable risks exceeded the benefits associated with 
[alendronate sodium’s] design or formulation” and that 
alendronate sodium “lacked efficacy and/or posed a greater 
likelihood of injury than other osteoporosis treatments.”14  
                                              
13 The Appellants misidentify the motion for judgment 
on the pleadings as a motion to dismiss in that statement. 
14 Count IX alleges, in part: 
 
232. When placed into the stream of commerce, 
ALENDRONATE SODIUM was defective in 
its design or formulation and was unreasonably 
dangerous in that its foreseeable risks exceeded 
the benefits associated with its design or 
formulation.  When placed into the stream of 
commerce, ALENDRONATE SODIUM was 
defective in design or formulation in that it 
lacked efficacy and/or posed a greater 
likelihood of injury than other osteoporosis 
treatments on the market and was more 
dangerous than ordinary consumers or their 
physicians could reasonably foresee or 
anticipate. 
17 
 
(J.A. Vol. 2 at 69-70.)  It is also the only count from the 
Appellants’ complaint that they mention in their opening 
brief.  Nowhere in the opening brief do they raise any 
arguments specific to a negligence-based design-defect claim 
or, for that matter, make any reference to such a claim at all.15  
                                                                                                     
 
233. Alternatively, when placed into the stream 
of commerce, ALENDRONATE SODIUM was 
defective in design and was unreasonably 
dangerous in that its label failed to warn 
physicians and patients of the dangers 
associated with long-term use of 
bisphosphonates, including, but not limited to 
the risk of severely suppressed bone turnover, 
brittle bones and a greater susceptibility to 
stress fractures or long bone fractures; and the 
label failed to instruct physicians and patients 
about the limited length of time 
ALENDRONATE SODIUM was actually 
effective in preventing fractures. 
 
(J.A. Vol. 2 at 69-71.) 
15  The shift to negligence-based arguments in the 
Appellants’ reply brief is not surprising given that the 
Supreme Court’s Bartlett decision – which, as discussed 
below, addressed strict-liability design-defect claims – issued 
during the pendency of this appeal.  According to the Generic 
Defendants, “[t]he bottom line … is that [the Appellants] 
placed their bets on the First Circuit’s Bartlett decision [that 
credited the theory embraced by the Appellants in their 
opening brief] … and they lost.”  (Appellees’ Br. at 3.)  After 
the Supreme Court overturned the First Circuit’s Bartlett 
18 
 
Therefore, fairly read, that brief is limited to the risk-utility 
based strict-liability design-defect claim set forth in Count 
IX.16 
 
The Appellants’ reply brief arguments, which go 
beyond the scope of Count IX and are outside of anything 
addressed in the opening brief, must be seen as waived.  We 
thus decline to consider whether there is any basis for 
distinguishing between negligence-based design-defect 
claims and strict-liability design-defect claims for pre-
emption purposes, and we withhold comment on whether 
                                                                                                     
opinion, the Appellants did not seek to file a revised opening 
brief.  They proposed for the original briefing to be continued 
with the Generic Defendants’ answering brief and their reply 
brief.   
16 The Appellants note that their design-defect claims 
under a risk-utility theory are rooted in the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Product Liability, which provides: 
A prescription drug … is not reasonably safe 
due to defective design if the foreseeable risks 
of harm posed by the drug … are sufficiently 
great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic 
benefits that reasonable health-care providers, 
knowing of such foreseeable risks and 
therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the 
drug or medical device for any class of patients. 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 6(c) 
(1998). 
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negligence-based design-defect claims are or are not pre-
empted.17 
 
B.   Pre-emption of the Appellants’ Strict-Liability  
 Design-Defect Claims 
 
“[T]he States possess sovereignty concurrent with that 
of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations 
imposed by the Supremacy Clause.”  Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 
U.S. 455, 458 (1990).  That Clause of the Constitution 
provides that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land[,] … any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  
The idea is simply stated, but it is seldom simple to determine 
whether the dissonance between a federal and state law is 
such that it requires the former to pre-empt the latter. 
 
Circumstances giving rise to pre-emption are typically 
divided into three categories: “state law must yield” (1) when 
a federal statute includes “an express provision for 
preemption”; (2) “[w]hen Congress intends federal law to 
‘occupy the field’” in an area of law; and (3) when a state and 
federal statute are in conflict.18  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign 
                                              
17 Our lack of comment is not a tacit endorsement of 
the Appellants’ negligence theory.  We have yet to hear how 
the Generic Defendants’ duties under negligence-based 
design-defect claims would be any different from their duties, 
discussed below, under strict-liability design-defect claims, 
i.e., changing the labeling, changing the composition, or 
removing the product from the market. 
18 Field pre-emption and conflict pre-emption may be 
viewed as “implied” pre-emption, as opposed to “express” 
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Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (citation omitted); 
see also Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 115 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(recognizing three different types of pre-emption).  The last 
variety is the one at issue here, and it comes in two sub-
varieties: impossibility pre-emption, which is when 
“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a 
physical impossibility,” and obstacle pre-emption, which is 
when a state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”  Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 
725, 747 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
MD Mall Assocs., LLC v. CSX Transp., Inc., 715 F.3d 479, 
495 (3d Cir. 2013).  The Generic Defendants’ arguments are 
confined to impossibility pre-emption. 
 
In Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), the Supreme 
Court considered impossibility pre-emption in the context of 
pharmaceutical regulation and state tort law.  The plaintiff in 
that case brought claims against the manufacturer of a brand-
name drug, alleging that the manufacturer failed to adequately 
warn of the risks posed by a particular way of administering 
the drug.  Id. at 559.  The manufacturer argued that the claims 
were pre-empted because it was impossible for it to comply 
with its state-law duty to modify the drug’s labeling without 
violating its duties under federal law.  Id. at 568.  The Levine 
Court “start[ed] with the assumption that the historic police 
                                                                                                     
pre-emption.  Roth v. Norfalco LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 374 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  As the Supreme Court has recognized, though, 
“the categories of preemption are not ‘rigidly distinct.’”  
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 
n.6 (2000) (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 
79 n.5 (1990)). 
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powers of the States were not to be superseded … unless that 
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  Id. at 565 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).  The 
Court said that manufacturers of brand-name drugs remain 
responsible for updating drug labeling and, as the 
manufacturer had not submitted evidence that the FDA would 
not have approved a change to the brand-name drug’s label, 
the manufacturer “failed to demonstrate that it was impossible 
for it to comply with both federal and state requirements.”19  
Id. at 573.  On the way to that conclusion, the Court “briefly 
review[ed] the history of federal regulation of drugs and drug 
labeling,” id. at 566, and stated that, “[i]n keeping with 
Congress’ decision not to pre-empt common-law tort suits, it 
appears that the FDA traditionally regarded state law as a 
complementary form of drug regulation,” id. at 578.20 
 
The Appellants assert that, under Levine’s presumption 
against pre-emption, we “should err on the side of not finding 
preemption … unless Congress has clearly spoken.”  
(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 13.)  The Supreme Court’s more 
recent opinions in Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011), and 
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013), however, hold that certain 
                                              
19 The Levine Court also rejected the brand-name drug 
manufacturer’s obstacle pre-emption argument.  Levine, 555 
U.S. at 573-81. 
20 The Court concluded that impossibility pre-emption 
was not applicable to design-defect claims against brand-
name manufacturers because federal law reflects “the [brand-
name] manufacturer’s ultimate responsibility for its label and 
provides a mechanism for adding safety information to the 
label prior to FDA approval.”  Id. at 571. 
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state-law claims against manufacturers of generic drugs 
conflict directly with federal law and are without effect 
because of impossibility pre-emption.  “When such 
preemption is found, liability cannot attach if the 
manufacturer has complied with the applicable federal 
standard.”  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 
§ 6 cmt. b.  The Appellants, recognizing the import of 
Mensing and Bartlett, argue that their strict-liability design-
defect claims are materially distinguishable from the claims at 
issue in those cases.21  To assess their arguments, then, we 
first consider Mensing and Bartlett in detail. 
                                              
21 The Appellants cite several decisions for the 
proposition that “[e]very circuit court of appeals … has found 
no FDCA pre-emption of design-defect claims.” (Appellants’ 
Opening Br. at 18 (citing Wimbush v. Wyeth, 619 F.3d 632, 
646 (6th Cir. 2010); Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 
F.3d 85, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2006); Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., 
Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 537 (6th Cir. 1993); Graham v. Wyeth 
Labs., 906 F.2d 1399, 1405 n.9 (10th Cir. 1990); Abbot v. Am. 
Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1114-15 (4th Cir. 1988); and 
Hurley v. Lederle Labs. Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d 
1173, 1177-78 (5th Cir. 1988)).)  All of those cases pre-date 
the Supreme Court’s Mensing and Bartlett decisions, 
however, and are distinguishable because they address pre-
emption in the context of claims against manufacturers of 
branded, not generic, drugs.  The Appellants also try to 
analogize this case to Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 
(1996), in which the Supreme Court held that the FDA’s 
“substantial equivalency” requirement for streamlined 
medical device approval did not pre-empt state-law design 
defect claims.  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 26.)  But the 
process for obtaining FDA approval of generic drugs under 
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1.   The Mensing Decision 
 
In Mensing, the Supreme Court consolidated appeals 
arising from decisions made by the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits.  Both plaintiffs in 
the two underlying cases had sued the manufacturers of 
metoclopramide tablets, a generic drug, alleging that long-
term use of the drug caused them to develop a severe 
neurological disorder.  Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2572-73.  They 
brought failure-to-warn claims, one under Louisiana law and 
the other under Minnesota state law.  Their contention was 
essentially that, “‘despite mounting evidence that long term 
metoclopramide use carries a risk of [the  neurological 
disorder] far greater than that indicated on the label,’ none of 
the [generic drug] [m]anufacturers had changed their labels to 
adequately warn of that danger.”  Id. at 2573.  The 
manufacturers countered with the argument that, as the Court 
put it, “federal statutes and FDA regulations required them to 
use the same safety and efficacy labeling as their brand-name 
counterparts,” such that they could not simultaneously fulfill 
their federal obligation while updating the labels for 
metoclopramide under their state tort law duty.  Id. at 2573.  
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits each rejected that argument and 
held that the plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims were not pre-
empted by federal law.  See id. 
 
                                                                                                     
the Hatch-Waxman Act is materially different from the 
streamlined medical device approval process.  As the 
Mensing Court noted, “different federal statutes and 
regulations may … lead to different pre-emption results.”  
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2582. 
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question 
of “whether federal drug regulations applicable to generic 
drug manufacturers directly conflict with, and thus pre-empt, 
… state-law [failure-to-warn] claims.”  Id. at 2572.  The 
answer was “yes.”  As the Court explained, “when a party 
cannot satisfy its state duties without the Federal 
Government’s special permission and assistance, which is 
dependent on the exercise of judgment by a federal agency, 
that party cannot independently satisfy those state duties for 
pre-emption purposes.”  Id. at 2581.  The Court observed that 
the tort laws of Louisiana and Minnesota “require a drug 
manufacturer that is or should be aware of its product’s 
danger to label that product in a way that renders it 
reasonably safe.”  Id. at 2573.  At the same time, federal FDA 
regulations “require that the warning labels of a brand-name 
drug and its generic copy must always be the same – thus, 
generic drug manufacturers have an ongoing federal duty of 
‘sameness.’”  Id. at 2574-75 (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 17961 
(1992)).  The particular issue was therefore whether “it is 
‘impossible for a private party to comply with both state and 
federal requirements.’”  Id. at 2577 (quoting Freightliner 
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)). 
 
The Court considered three arguments – two from the 
plaintiffs and one from the FDA22 – for why generic drug 
manufacturers could comply with state-law warning 
requirements and avoid liability while also satisfying the 
                                              
22 The United States filed an amicus brief setting forth 
the FDA’s views.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondents, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 
S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501), 2011 
WL 741927; Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2575 n.3. 
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FDA’s requirement that generic drugs always have the same 
labeling as their brand name counterparts.  First,  the 
plaintiffs argued that the FDA’s “changes-being-effected” 
(“CBE”) process allows generic drug manufacturers to update 
warnings on labels,23 but the Court concluded that the CBE 
process only allows those manufacturers to update their 
labeling to match the brand-name drug’s labeling.  Id. at 
2575.  Second, the plaintiffs submitted that the manufacturers 
can send out letters to inform physicians of new warnings.  Id. 
at 2576.  The Court held that the manufacturers cannot do 
that, though, because the FDA considers such letters to be 
“labeling” that must be consistent with the labeling provided 
with the drug.  Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d)(1)).  Third, 
the FDA argued that generic drug manufacturers can satisfy 
both state- and federal-law duties by proposing stronger 
labeling to the FDA when they believe new warnings are 
needed.  Id.  The Court determined, however, that even if 
those manufacturers have a federal duty to ask for FDA 
assistance to change labeling, “federal law would permit 
[them] to comply with the state labeling requirements if, and 
only if, the FDA and the brand-name manufacturer changed 
the brand-name label to do so.”  Id. at 2578.  The Court 
                                              
23 As the Supreme Court summarized, the CBE process 
“permits drug manufacturers to ‘add or strengthen a 
contraindication, warning, [or] precaution,’ or to ‘add or 
strengthen an instruction about dosage and administration that 
is intended to increase the safe use of the drug product’” by 
filing a supplemental application with the FDA.  Mensing, 
131 S. Ct. at 2575 (alteration in original) (quoting 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C)).  In the CBE process, “drug 
manufacturers need not wait for preapproval by the FDA, 
which is ordinarily necessary to change a label.”  Id. 
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observed that one “can often imagine that a third party or the 
Federal Government might do something that makes it lawful 
for a private party to accomplish under federal law what state 
law requires of it,” but “[i]f these conjectures suffice to 
prevent federal and state law from conflicting for Supremacy 
Clause purposes, it [would be] unclear when, outside of 
express pre-emption, the Supremacy Clause would have any 
force.”  Id. at 2579. 
 
Because it was impossible for the generic drug 
manufacturers to “independently do under federal law what 
state law requires of [them]” – to change the drug label – the 
Supreme Court held that the state law failure-to-warn claims 
against the manufacturers were pre-empted.  Id.  As other 
circuit courts have observed, and we concur, Mensing holds 
that manufacturers cannot unilaterally change a generic 
drug’s labeling, and therefore a state-law claim premised on 
such a manufacturer being obligated to revise its label is pre-
empted.  See  Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 476 
(4th Cir. 2014); Morris v. PLIVA, Inc., 713 F.3d 774, 776-77 
(5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Bell v. Pfizer, Inc.,716 F.3d 
1087, 1095-96 (8th Cir. 2013); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 
F.3d 1273, 1288 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 
2.   The Bartlett Decision 
 
While the present case was pending, the Supreme 
Court decided Bartlett, which considered whether design-
defect claims under New Hampshire law were pre-empted.24  
133 S. Ct. at 2473.  The Court noted that the claims were 
                                              
24 We granted the Generic Defendants’ motion to stay 
this appeal pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Bartlett.   
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strict-liability design-defect claims because New Hampshire 
law imposes a duty on manufacturers to ensure that their 
products are not “unreasonably dangerous,” a duty which can 
be achieved in the context of pharmaceuticals in two ways – 
“either by changing a drug’s design or by changing its 
labeling.”25  Id. at 2474.  Importantly, the Court held that 
manufacturers do not have the option of redesigning a generic 
drug because, under the FDCA’s requirements, “were [a 
manufacturer] to change the composition of its [generic drug], 
the altered chemical would be a new drug that would require 
its own NDA to be marketed in interstate commerce.”  Id. at 
2475.  The Bartlett Court thus observed that “New Hampshire 
law ultimately required [the defendant manufacturer] to 
change [the drug’s] labeling.”  Id. at 2474.  But under 
Mensing, “federal law prevents generic drug manufacturers 
from changing their labels.”  Id. at 2476.  Accordingly, 
“federal law prohibited [the generic drug manufacturer] from 
taking the remedial action required to avoid liability under 
New Hampshire law,” and the rule of impossibility pre-
emption applied.  Id.   
 
In the course of its analysis, the Supreme Court also 
rejected “as incompatible with … pre-emption jurisprudence” 
the so-called “stop-selling” argument.  Id. at 2477.  That 
argument, which had been endorsed by the United States 
                                              
25 The Supreme Court contrasted “strict liability” and 
“absolute liability” by noting that a “‘strict-liability’ regime” 
is one “in which liability does not depend on negligence, but 
still signals the breach of a duty,” while an “‘absolute-
liability’ regime” is one “in which liability does not reflect 
the breach of any duties at all, but merely serves to spread 
risk.”  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473. 
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Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, reasons that a 
manufacturer can avoid a conflict between its state- and 
federal-law duties by simply choosing to halt sales of the 
generic drug.  Id.  The Supreme Court said, however, that its 
“pre-emption cases presume that an actor seeking to satisfy 
both his federal- and state-law obligations is not required to 
cease acting altogether in order to avoid liability.  Indeed, if 
the option of ceasing to act defeated a claim of impossibility, 
impossibility pre-emption would be all but meaningless.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Strayhorn v. 
Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 398 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting 
the Supreme Court’s unqualified rejection of the stop-selling 
theory). 
 
 3.   Analysis 
 
The Appellants attempt to distinguish Mensing and 
Bartlett by arguing that those decisions were limited to the 
pre-emption of “warnings-based” claims.  (Appellants’ Reply 
Br. at 1, 6.)  They say that the claims at issue here do not 
necessarily require the Generic Defendants to unilaterally 
change the labeling for alendronate sodium, so the Generic 
Defendants’ state-law duties do not “conflict with … any 
specific provisions of the FDCA” and thus do not raise 
impossibility pre-emption.  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 16.)   
In support of that argument, the Appellants draw our attention 
to the Supreme Court’s choice of language in Bartlett: 
“[S]tate-law design-defect claims that turn on the adequacy 
of a drug’s warnings are pre-empted by federal law under 
[Mensing].”  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470 (emphasis added).  
Under the Appellants’ reading of the case, Bartlett only 
stands for the pre-emption of strict-liability design-defect 
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claims against generic manufacturers when a state imposes a 
duty to strengthen a drug’s warning.26   
                                              
26 The Appellants lay particular emphasis on comment 
k to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as an 
example of what Bartlett held to be pre-empted.  That 
comment requires manufacturers of “[u]navoidably unsafe 
products” to provide adequate warnings in order to avoid 
strict liability for design defects.  2 Restatement (Second) 
Torts § 402A cmt. k (1965).  It states: 
 
There are some products which, in the present 
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable 
of being made safe for their intended and 
ordinary use.  These are especially common in 
the field of drugs. … Such a product, properly 
prepared, and accompanied by proper directions 
and warning, is not defective, nor is it 
unreasonably dangerous. … The seller of such 
products, … with the qualification that they are 
properly prepared and marketed, and proper 
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, 
is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate 
consequences attending their use, merely 
because he has undertaken to supply the public 
with an apparently useful and desirable product, 
attended with a known but apparently 
reasonable risk. 
 
Id.  In other words, comment k is a defense to a strict-liability 
design-defect claim when a product that is unavoidably 
unsafe is accompanied by proper warnings.  See Restatement 
(Third) Torts: Products Liability § 6 Reporter’s Note cmt. f 
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That is too narrow a reading of the Supreme Court’s 
instructions.  As the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit has held, “[t]ogether, [Mensing and Bartlett] 
establish that under the FDCA a generic [drug manufacturer] 
may not unilaterally change its labeling or change its design 
or formulation, and cannot be required to exit the market or 
accept state tort liability.”  Drager, 741 F.3d at 476.  Thus, to 
the extent it is impossible for a generic drug manufacturer to 
comply with its duty under a state tort law unless it takes one 
of those actions, that law is pre-empted by the FDCA.  Id.   
 
At oral argument, the Generic Defendants emphasized 
that, although the claims at issue were brought under the laws 
of 28 different states, they could only avoid liability by taking 
one of the options that Mensing and Bartlett say they cannot 
be forced to take:  (1) changing alendronate sodium’s 
labeling, (2) changing the drug’s design, or (3) ceasing sales 
of the drug altogether.  In the end, the Appellants were forced 
                                                                                                     
(citing cases recognizing comment k to § 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) Torts as a defense). 
However, the Supreme Court’s Bartlett decision did 
not hinge on the availability of the comment k defense.  The 
Court determined that it is not possible, under federal law, for 
a manufacturer to redesign a generic drug.  Bartlett, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2475.  Thus, a generic drug manufacturer facing 
liability under a risk-utility legal framework – regardless of 
whether a comment k defense is available – is in an 
impossible position: keep the drug the same and violate state 
law, or change the drug and violate federal law.  Id. (“In the 
drug context, either increasing the ‘usefulness’ of a product or 
reducing its ‘risk of danger’ would require redesigning the 
drug … .”). 
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to concede that point, in effect if not in words.  They tried to 
avoid the “scope of Mensing’s reach” by saying that their 
design-defect claims are not intended to relate to any drug 
warnings accompanying alendronate sodium.27  (Appellants’ 
Opening Br. at 10.)  They also state that they “do not seek a 
‘change’ in [alendronate sodium’s] design” (id. at 21), which 
is not yielding much, since the Bartlett decision clearly holds 
that such a redesign is impossible under federal law for a 
generic drug manufacturer.  The Appellants are left with their 
position that their strict-liability design-defect claims impose 
liability “for the [Generic Defendants’] willful choice to sell a 
particular product” with an unreasonably dangerous design.  
(Id.)  In other words, they are trying to resurrect the “stop-
selling” theory, under which the Generic Defendants can only 
avoid state-law liability by halting their sales of alendronate 
sodium.28  But Bartlett categorically rejected that theory, and 
that ends the argument.29 
                                              
27 They note that plaintiffs in other cases have been 
“guilty of sloppy draftsmanship” for asserting design-defect 
claims that “allege[] that part of what makes a product 
defective by design is that the ‘design’ of the product did not 
include appropriate warnings.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 
12.)  But, they say, they have “carefully pleaded their 
complaint” to avoid such a reliance on the adequacy of 
alendronate sodium’s warnings.  (Id.) 
28 The Appellants also argue that, when the comment k 
defense is not available or applicable, “states applying 
[§] 402A generally impose no duty on a manufacturer to 
either re-design their product or strengthen their warnings” 
because it promotes a “risk-spreading goal.”  (Appellants’ 
Reply Br. at 10 (emphasis added).)  To the extent the 
Appellants ask us to consider an absolute-liability regime, 
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Admittedly, the Supreme Court was careful in both 
Mensing and Bartlett to consider pre-emption in the context 
of the specific state laws at issue in those cases.  But we have 
not been directed to any specific state law regime by the 
Appellants and we need not ponder hypothetical state laws.  
When we pressed the Appellants at oral argument to give an 
example of a strict-liability design-defect claim under any 
relevant state regime that would not ultimately result in some 
combination of the same three options for the Generic 
Defendants – i.e., changing the labeling of alendronate 
sodium, changing the design of the drug, or pulling the drug 
from the market – they were unable to identify such a claim.  
Nothing in the briefing offered any state-specific pre-emption 
analysis either.  Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to embark 
                                                                                                     
that argument was waived because it was not raised in their 
opening brief.  See Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 
707 F.3d 223, 231 n.13 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding an issue 
waived “unless a party raises it in its opening brief”).  Like 
the Bartlett Court, we need not address absolute liability 
claims, and we “save for another day the question whether a 
true absolute-liability state-law system could give rise to 
impossibility preemption.”  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 n.1. 
29 The Generic Defendants argue that the Appellants 
waived their stop-selling theory with respect to their design-
defect claims for not raising it in the District Court.  We do 
not reach that waiver issue because, even if the argument 
were not waived, the stop-selling rationale was expressly 
rejected by the Bartlett Court as inconsistent with 
impossibility pre-emption jurisprudence. 
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on a 28-state tour of strict-liability design-defect law.30  Cf. 
Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1288 (finding that, as “[n]o effort [wa]s 
made to identify a mechanism through which [the generic 
drug manufacturer] could have modified or supplemented the 
warranties allegedly breached without running afoul of the 
duty of sameness identified in Mensing … , the [plaintiff’s] 
claims are preempted to the extent they rest on inadequate 
labeling as broadly defined by the FDA.”). 
 
In sum, Mensing and Bartlett recognize that 
manufacturers have no control over the design or labeling of 
                                              
30 The Appellants argue in their reply brief that their 
design-defect claims “differ greatly from state to state and 
must be analyzed individually, rather than through a summary 
dismissal on the pleadings.”  (Appellants’ Reply Br. at 14.)  
However, this contradicts the position in their opening brief 
that, although the “Appellants hail from 28 different states, … 
each [with] their own laws governing design defect claims[,] 
… this Court should simply consider Appellants’ design 
defect claims as pled and in light of the prevailing view of 
preemption as to state tort law claims generally and design 
defect claims specifically.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 6 n.3 
(emphasis added).)  Moreover, the Appellants never raised 
any state-specific pre-emption arguments in the District 
Court.  Rather, they only argued, in generalities, that their 
design-defect claims survive Mensing, and they rebutted the 
notion that some states do not “recognize defective design as 
a vital theory of liability.”  (J.A. Vol. 2 at 165.)  They did not 
argue that a state-by-state analysis is necessary for 
determining whether such claims – if they are indeed 
recognized by all 28 states relevant to this case – are pre-
empted. 
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generic drugs.  Short of exiting the market – which Bartlett 
rejects – the Appellants have failed to identify anything the 
Generic Defendants can do to reconcile their conflicting 
duties under state and federal law.31  Therefore, the 
Appellants’ strict-liability design-defect claims are pre-
empted. 
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment for the Generic Defendants. 
                                              
31 The Appellants argue that the Hatch-Waxman Act 
“did not give generic drugmakers a free pass in remaining 
ignorant of drugs’ risks (or concealing those risks).”  
(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 15.)  Regardless of the appeal 
such policy arguments may have, they are unavailing 
because, as the Supreme Court stated in Bartlett, “sympathy 
for [a plaintiff] does not relieve us of the responsibility of 
following the law.”  133 S. Ct. at 2478. 
